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I.

INTRODUCTION

The next time you attend a small gathering of about ten or twelve
people, look around the room carefully. If the group is statistically average, one of the people there has been, is, or will be mentally ill and a
patient in a mental hospital, perhaps involuntarily committed.' Moreover, many of that person's friends and associates may never know that
he or she has suffered and recovered from this disability. Ten percent of
all Americans have a personal brush with mental disturbance so serious
as to require hospitalization. Far greater numbers endure lesser degrees
of mental illness.2 To these, and to all thinking citizens, the procedures
for admission to hospitals for the mentally ill and the treatment within
those hospitals present immediate and pressing problems.
When an individual who is mentally ill3 engages in potentially dangerous behavior,4 he or she may be taken involuntarily to an emergency
1. See M. Gregg Bloche & Francine Cournos, Mental Health Policy for the 1990s:
Tinkering in the Interstices, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 387, 388-91 (1990) (citing statistics).
The number of individuals who experience a mental disorder necessitating hospitalization
represents less than one-half of the estimated total of the 52 million Americans-more than one in
four-who suffer from any type of mental disorder during a year. See Darrel A. Regier et a!., The
de Facto US. Mental and Addictive DisordersService System, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
85, 88 (1993). In addition, the number of individuals hospitalized falls far short of the actual
need, since only 14.7% of the population ever receives some kind of treatment. Id. at 89-90, 92.
2. Bloche & Cournos, supra note 1, at 388; Regier, supra note 1, at 88.
3. For example, Florida law defines mental illness as an "impairment of the emotional
processes, of the ability to exercise conscious control of one's actions, or of the ability to perceive
reality or to understand, which impairment substantially interferes with a person's ability to meet
the ordinary demands of living, regardless of etiology." FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3) (1995). See
generally BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL IsSUEs IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 65-76 (1993) (defining legal standards for mental illness in each state); John Parry, Survey

of Standardsfor Extended Involuntary Commitment, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
329 (1994).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(b)(2) ("a substantial likelihood that.., he will cause
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room by a police officer.' Upon arrival, a psychiatrist may sign an order
authorizing hospitalization for a time set by law. 6 If hospital staff members subsequently determine that the individual requires longer term
hospitalization, they will petition a court for a civil commitment order.7
After commitment, if the individual refuses to take prescribed medication, the hospital staff may seek an order through an administrative or
8
judicial process to permit forced medication.
Within the mental health system, a wide range of circumstances
occur that could cause disputes to develop. Most disputes that arise,
however, involve involuntary civil commitment or medication refusal.9
In these and other situations, the mechanisms for resolving disputes generally encompass a mixture of clinical and judicial decisionmaking, even
though the law has not shown a preference for one model over another. 10
In part, this reflects the inconsistency in court decisions concerning individuals with mental disabilities. The United States Supreme Court, for
instance, has characterized involuntary civil commitment both as a

serious bodily harm to himself or others..."). See generally WALTER E. BARTON & GAIL M.
BARTON, ETHICS AND LAW IN MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 177-203 (1984) (discussing
criteria and procedures for admission in several states); WEINER & WETTSTEN, supra note 3, at

53-59.
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2)(a)(2) ("A law enforcement officer shall take a person
who appears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination into custody.., for examination.").
6. See, e.g., id. § 394.463(2)(c) (72 hours).
7. See, e.g., id. § 394.463(2)(d)(4) ("A petition for involuntary placement shall be executed
...when treatment is deemed necessary ...").
8. See. e.g., id. § 394.459(3)(a) ("If any patient refuses to consent to treatment ... the
administrator shall immediately petition the court for a hearing ....");see also Dautremont v.
Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 298 (8th Cir. 1987) (hospitalized civil patients may be
involuntarily treated with psychotropic drugs against their will); State ex rel. Jones v.
Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Wis. 1987) ("the state and county concede that psychotropic
drugs are involuntarily given to all types of patients"); Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1351 n.151 (1974) (hereinafter Civil
Commitement] ("Most civil commitment statutes ...either do not discuss a patient's right to
refuse unwanted treatments, or allow for the overruling of a competent patient's treatment
decision for all but the most intrusive types of treatment." (citations omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. Rv.343, 343-64 & nn.79-82 (1995) (explaining
disputes over mental patients' right to refuse treatment); id. at 408-22 (analyzing data from right
to refuse cases). See generally Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts andMental DisabilityLaw: The Case
of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993) (discussing conflicts within the mental health
system, especially those involving involuntary civil commitment).

10. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" Collide:
The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REv. 447, 476-79 &
n.101, 493 & n.147 (1990) (citing statutes and comparing the 14 states using a clinical
decisionmaker model with the 18 states using a judicial decisionmaker model); Julie M. Zito et al.,
Toward a Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Medication Refusal in the Court Review Model,
11 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 151, 151-53 (1993).
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" 'massive curtailment of liberty,' "II and, in some cases, as based on a
medical decision best left to the judgment of doctors.2 Similarly, New
York's highest court found administrative decisionmaking in cases of
medication refusal unconstitutional under state law,'13 three years after a
federal court found the same process constitutional under federal law.' 4
This Comment considers the procedures for resolving disputes in
the contexts of involuntary civil commitment and medication refusal.
Specifically, it addresses whether current methods for resolving admissions and treatment disputes meet the procedural due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and whether those
procedures adequately protect individuals in the mental health system.
Part II surveys the civil commitment process with a discussion of the
present state of the law. This discussion focuses on existing procedural
due process protections for those individuals with mental disabilities.
Part III offers some suggestions to improve commitment procedures
within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court to protect an
individual's due process rights. Part IV analyzes the right to refuse
treatment in the mental health system, particularly the right to refuse
medication. Part V then argues that formal adversarial procedures offer
the best due process protection for an individual's right to refuse
treatment.
II.

CIVIL COMMITMENT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Due process may be defined roughly as using the legal system to
protect a person's rights. 15 In construing an individual's rights under the
Due Process Clause,' 6 the Supreme Court has said that procedural due
process is a flexible concept. 7 In the context of administrative or judicial action that threatens a protected interest, the Court has concluded
that due process demands "an opportunity to be heard."' 8 Although the
11. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
12. E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,

607 (1979).
13. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986).
14. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).

15. More formally stated, due process of law is "[a] course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the
enforcement and protection of private rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990).
16. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment imposes a parallel requirement on
the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

18. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908). Justice Frankfurter has also observed:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.
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Court has not yet settled many issues concerning the number of procedural safeguards which the state must accord a person whom it seeks to
commit involuntary, the Court has held that due process requires fair
procedures to guard against erroneous deprivations of liberty. 9 Specifically, the state must use fair procedures to determine that an individual
is dangerous to himself or others due to a mental problem.20 In addition,
the Court has ruled that the state must grant equivalent procedural safe-

guards to individuals whom it seeks to commit in civil proceedings and
who have been found mentally incompetent in connection with criminal
trials.2 1
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to popular
government, that justice has been done.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See generally Henry J. Friendly, "'Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267
(1975).
19. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("the quantum and
quality of the process due in a particular situation depends upon the need to serve the purpose of
minimizing the risk of error").
20. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 572-76 (1975). Although circumstances may
occur that would justify the government detaining a person at a mental health care facility for a
short time prior to a hearing, due process normally requires that an adult receive notice and a
hearing prior to being involuntary committed to a state mental health facility. See Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138-39 (1990).
In Zinermon, the individual signed forms requesting voluntary admission and never received
any type of hearing concerning whether he should have been committed to the facility. Id. at 11820. In his subsequent suit against the government, he alleged that the hospital employees knew, or
should have known, that he was mentally ill and incapable of giving consent to a voluntary
admission, and that he would not have met the statutory conditions for involuntary placement. Id.
at 121. Further, the hospital employees did not follow statutory procedures for short-term
emergency admissions. Id. at 133-34. The Zinermon Court held only that the individual's
complaint was sufficient to establish a due process violation if he could prove his allegations at
trial. Id. at 139. The Supreme Court did not examine the state's procedures for short-term
emergency admissions or explain the circumstances under which an adult could be detained at a
mental health care facility prior to a hearing. See generally Bruce J. Winick, Competency to
Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization. A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v.
Burch, 14 INr'L J.L. & PSYCHATRy 169, 177-82 (1991) (discussing the implications of the
Zinermon decision).
21. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The Court began eliminating the differences between civil commitment and
civil trial procedures in cases such as In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that notice, counsel,
confrontation rights, and the right to remain silent be provided children alleged to be delinquent)
and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the reasonable doubt standard of proof must
be applied in juvenile proceedings). In both cases, the Court declared that the potential for
deprivation of liberty was a more important factor than the status of the defendant in determining
appropriate procedures. A number of federal courts subsequently applied these principles to the
mental health context. E.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). In Heryford, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether
the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood
of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime,
rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-
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Similarly, in Lessard v. Schmidt,22 a landmark case declaring Wisconsin's civil commitment statutes unconstitutional, the district court
found that "the interests in avoiding civil commitment are at least as
high as those of persons accused of criminal offenses. 23 The court thus
called for the same due process safeguards against unjustified deprivations of liberty that are accorded those accused of crime. 24 These safeguards included timely notice of "charges" justifying detention;
adversary counsel; impermissibility of "hearsay evidence"; the privilege
against self-incrimination; and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.25 The court also defined dangerousness very narrowly: "[T]he
state must bear the burden of proving that there is an extreme likelihood
that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself
or others."26 In Addington v. Texas,27 however, the Supreme Court
rejected the Lessard standard of proof and held that the state must produce "clear and convincing" evidence that a person is mentally ill and
dangerous before he or she may be involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital.28
The Lessard decision prompted state legislatures to change their
commitment statutes to ensure that their laws provided mental patients
with the new court-defined constitutional rights.29 In particular, many
minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the constitutional
safeguards of due process.
Id. at 396.
22. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remandedon proceduralgrounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
23. Id. at 1090; see also Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1092 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (echoing the Lessard court's analogy of commitment to conviction); Dixon v.
Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (same).
24. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1090.
25. Id. at 1090-1103.
26. Id. at 1093.
27. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
28. Id. at 431-33; see also In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence); cf Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644
(1993) (upholding Kentucky's higher burden of proof standard for commitment of the mentally ill
than for the mentally retarded). A defendant acquitted of a criminal charge on the basis of an
insanity defense, however, may be committed to a psychiatric facility on that basis, even though
the defense was established by a "preponderance of the evidence," rather than by "clear and
convincing" evidence. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366-68 (1983).
29. Reed Groethe, Comment, Overt DangerousBehavioras a ConstitutionalRequirementfor
Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally 1ll, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 562-63, 565 (1977);
John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposesof Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFF. L.
REv. 499, 499-500 (1981); Michael J. Leiber, Interactions Between Civil Commitment and
Protective Placement: An EmpiricalAssessment, 15 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 265 (1992).
Despite the statutory protections for commitment, research has found that procedures for
involuntary commitment tend to be perfunctory and a legal charade, which merely "rubber stamp"
psychiatric recommendations. See, e.g., Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally 11l, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424, 448-50 (1966); Virginia A. Hiday,
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states changed their involuntary commitment laws to require a finding of
mental illness and dangerousness to self or to others as the only grounds
for commitment.30 A number of states, either by statute or by court
decision, required the government to present evidence of recent overt
acts demonstrating that the individual was dangerous. 3 1 Most jurisdicReformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 651, 655 (1977); Saleem A. Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental Health in the
Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 674, 714 (1974). Studies have illustrated the
extremely brief nature of hearings, with little or no factual evidence presented on which to make a
determination of mental illness or dangerousness. See Cohen, supra, at 430; Virginia A. Hiday,
Court Decisions in Civil Commitment, 4 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 159, 159 (1981). Although
studies have found courts rejecting their judicial role and deferring to psychiatry, a study in one
state suggests that the courts may be moving toward acting more independently in the
commitment decision. Hiday, Court Decisions in Civil Commitment, supra, at 166-67; see also
Morris, supra note 9, at 431 (describing data on the author's experience as a hearing officer in
competency cases and concluding that hearings were not perfunctory). An independent system, as
proposed in the next section, would continue to foster independence and conceivably eliminate the
perfunctory nature of hearings. See discussion infra section III.
30. See WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 3, at 49-52; La Fond, supra note 29, at 501;
Leiber, supra note 29, at 265; John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A
Constitutional Perspective, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 320, 322-23 (1994).

Compare Rodriguez v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 1173, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
statutory requirement of "conduct demonstrating that a person is dangerous to herself...
incorporates wide range of behavior") and In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 572
(Iowa 1995) (finding that "involuntary commitment is limited to [those] who are a danger to
themselves or the community" and thus "[t]reatment alone is no justification for confinement")
with James C. Beck & John W. Parry, Incompetence, Treatment Refusal, and Hospitalization,20
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCrIATRY & L. 261, 262 (1992) (proposing a narrowing of commitment
statutes based only on the need for treatment).
Some states have included harm to "property" as a commitment criterion. See, e.g., Suzuki v.
Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980). In Suzuki, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found such a
provision in Hawaii's statute unconstitutionally broad:
We need not decide whether a state may ever commit one who is dangerous to
property. This statute would allow commitment for danger to any property
regardless of value or significance. . . . Under the current Hawaii definition of
"danger to property," a person could be committed if he threatened to shoot a
trespassing dog. The state's interest in protecting animals must be outweighed by
the individual's interest in personal liberty.
Id. at 176.
31. See Groethe, supra note 29, at 576-79; La Fond, supra note 29, at 502. Some have
argued, however, that the restriction of civil commitment to those who are overtly dangerous
leaves too many severely ill individuals suffering silently without care. See Paul Chodoff, The
Casefor Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally II1, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 499-500
(1976); Darold A. Treffert, "Dying With Their Rights On", 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1041
(1973). Anecdotal accounts of patients who have "died with their rights on" are easily countered
by other stories of patients who, under looser commitment criteria, have been needlessly confined
for decades. See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,70 CAL. L. Rev. 54, 67-79 (1982). To resolve these
conflicts, researchers should conduct studies to compare the effects of the need for treatment with
dangerousness-based commitment systems. Only then would we know whether a system inclined
to favor involuntary treatment is likely to create a greater amount of needless suffering than one
that errs in favor of liberty. See generally Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, A Search for the
Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally
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tions today also abide by the holding in Wyatt v. Stickney, that "[n]o
person shall be deemed incompetent to manage his affairs, to contract, to
hold professional or occupational or vehicle operator's licenses, to marry
and obtain a divorce, to register and vote, or to make a'33will solely by
reason of his admission or commitment to the hospital.
Despite the diversity of procedural protections among the states, the
Supreme Court has largely avoided direct rulings on procedural aspects
of civil commitment. In Parham v. JR.,34 however, the Court addressed
the procedural mechanisms necessary to protect a minor's liberty interests upon a parental or guardian request for commitment.3 5 Applying
the balancing formula announced three years earlier in Mathews v.
Eldridge,3 6 the Parham Court authorized the use of minimal, informal
procedures as sufficient under the Due Process Clause. In refusing to
find that children were entitled to the full panoply of due process protec-

tions that now characterize adult commitment, the Court held that an
independent medical evaluation of the child's need for hospitalization by
a staff physician of the admitting hospital would be sufficient:
Due process has never been thought to require that the neutral and
detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative
officer. Surely, this is the case as to medical decisions, for "neither
judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than
psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments." Thus, a staff physician will suffice, so long as he or she is free to evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional condition and need for
11,
40 RUTGERS L. REv. 303. 325-30, 343-57, 360-61 (1988) (discussing the need for empirical
studies to examine the efficacy of mental health treatment; highlighting the benefits and limits of
drug therapy; noting the harmful effects of involuntary commitment; and concluding that further
research is needed in a variety of contexts within the mental health system to develop sound
public policy).
32. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
33. Id.at 379; see also Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251, 252, 258-59 (Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985)

(noting that most states today follow Wyatt).
34. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
35. Although the Court strongly suggested that the constitution requires, at some later point in
time, procedures to determine whether continuing confinement is justified, it failed to address the
issue directly. See Parham,442 U.S. at 617.
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court enunciated the following considerations
which must be balanced in determining the procedures due in a particular situation:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
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treatment.3 7

Two aspects of the Parham approach to minimal due process safeguards have significance for adult commitment procedures.38 First, the
Court sanctioned the use of an expert decisionmaker in place of a judicial or administrative hearing official. Second, the Court indicated that
an adjudicative-type adversary hearing is not the only form of decisionmaking encompassed within the concept of due process.
The Supreme Court has not ruled, however, that due process
requires the use of a decisionmaker in the mental health context who has
no connection with the relevant institution or state bureaucracy.39 This
procedural protection would not be necessary if the "due process hearing" is simply the initial examination by the staff psychiatrist. Only certain circumstances would demand independence from the institution.4"
For example, a hospital and its employees might have an interest in
whether to administer medication, since that decision could affect safety
and working conditions within a particular institution.4" To ensure neutrality, due process requires that the individual making the decision have
no substantial involvement in arriving at the original decision to commit.42 Once an individual has rendered a decision to commit another, it
is doubtful that he or she could fairly be entrusted with further decisionmaking responsibility, even if different procedures would develop more
and, hopefully, better information. Most people cannot truly keep an
open mind about a specific question upon which they have previously
announced a position because they become "psychologically wedded" to
37. Parham, 442 U.S. at 607 (citations omitted).
38. See id. at 627-28 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J. and Stevens, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (arguing that procedures equal to those provided adults should be required
before commitment to mental institutions).
39. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980) (holding that due process requires
procedural safeguards which include an adversarial hearing before an independent institutional
decisionmaker); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 264, 267-68 (1970).
40. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975) (due process requires, at a
minimum, "give-and-take" between students and disciplinarians, notice to students of the grounds
for suspension, and an opportunity for students to explain their actions); see also In re Detention
of R.R., 895 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that although individuals must make

commitment decisions "in a neutral and detached atmosphere," the burden of demonstrating a
conflict of interest rests with the person asserting the conflict).
41. See Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse

Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rav. 461, 478 (1978).
42. See In re R.M., 889 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Mont. 1995) (finding violation of due process and
civil commitment statute where the same person who filed the commitment petition also
conducted the patient's examination); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); cf
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) ("In our view, due process requires that after the

arrest, the determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by
someone not directly involved in the case.").
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their initial position.4 3

A final due process concern, distinct from the approach of Parham
and its requirement that a decisionmaker remain neutral, involves providing individuals in the mental health system with procedures they will
perceive as fair. 44 The Supreme Court addressed this concern in another
context, holding in Goldberg v. Kelly,4" that due process entitles welfare
recipients to a hearing before the government may terminate their welfare benefits." Although primarily concerned with issues of accuracy,
the Court also recognized that termination without a hearing could be
psychologically harmful, potentially damaging feelings of security, dignity, and self-worth. 4 7

Similarly, the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence4" accords with
the Goldberg Court's determination that people likely will perceive

hearings that lack due process characteristics as unfair.49 That unfairness, in turn, may have negative implications for the ensuing therapeutic
43. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975) (failing to find in this case "that the
adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously
or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position," yet leaving open the
possibility for such a finding in other circumstances).
44. For example, having the opportunity to participate fully in the resolution of conflict has a
notable influence on perceived fairness. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
(one of the "central concerns of procedural due process" is "the promotion of participation and
dialogue by affected individuals in the decision making process"); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624,
636 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80 (1985) (discussing "the claim that
the dignity and self-respect of the individual can be protected only through processes of
government in which there is meaningful participation by affected interests"); Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 50 (1976) ("[A]
lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that
society properly deems independently valuable."). See generallyJohn J. Ensminger & Thomas D.
Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored
Potential,6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of
Judicial Procedures: Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings,46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992).
45. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id. at 264-66. See infra notes 181 -189 and accompanying text.
48. The originators of therapeutic jurisprudence define it as "the study of the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent." DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1991); see Christopher Slobgin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dimensions
to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 193, 196 (1995) (describing therapeutic jurisprudence as
"the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the
psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects").
49. See WEXLER & WNICK, supra note 48, at 75-76, 79; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and
Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 979, 985 (1991); see also Bruce J. Winick, Harnessingthe Power
of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45
U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 766-67 (1991). See generally David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17 (1993).
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process. The next section, therefore, offers some ideas to improve
existing procedures that would provide more meaningful opportunities
for people to participate, to be treated with dignity and respect, and to
receive the full panoply of due process protections.
III.

IMPROVING THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS

The Supreme Court has indicated that compliance with due process
neither requires the decisionmaker to be a judge nor the venue of the
hearing to be a court. 50 Accordingly, an independent commitment system could be implemented that would assume all the responsibilities
now assigned to the mental health and justice systems. Implementation
of this new system may provide improved due process protections, offer
greater therapeutic benefits, and ameliorate problems within the civil
commitment process, such as the continued neutrality of a
decisionmaker.
Under an independent system, clinicians would make initial evaluations and emergency commitment decisions. To perform this role, clinicians would undergo extensive training. 51 Although these clinicians
would not provide treatment, they would reevaluate patients after a decision had been made to file for long-term commitment. Clinicians would
also furnish the relevant testimony at commitment hearings.
Hearing officers (perhaps judges, perhaps not) who have also
received specialized training in the clinical and legal aspects of mental
disorders would conduct hearings. Hearings would be conducted in a
manner that fully considers individual views, that treats everyone with
dignity and respect, and that fosters trust in authority and in the process. 2 Specialists in mental health advocacy (probably, but not necessarily attorneys) would provide representation for both sides. One
advocate would represent the petitioner, another the respondent. The
advocates might periodically alternate the sides they represented to gain
greater experience in and understanding of all aspects of the hearing
process. Appeal from the hearing officer's decision would be available.
The system, however, would operate on the assumption that appeals
would rarely be pursued. Courts would place a heavy burden on appellants to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the hearing officer's
50. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
51. Training would also include instruction in the laws, regulations, and policies of the civil
commitment process. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 30, at 327.
52. See generally Pamela Casey et al., Toward an Agenda for Reform of Justice and Mental
Health Systems Interactions, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 117-21 (1992) (recommending a

system that improves patients' perceptions and ensures dignity and respect).
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determination.5

In an effort to improve the civil commitment process, one state has
already established an independent screening agency with the authority
to review clinicians' recommendations for commitment, even in emergencies.54 Some states have established administrative boards that sit
for the sole purpose of making commitment decisions." Other states
use specialized hearing officers to adjudicate certain aspects of the commitment process.5 6 Several jurisdictions have agencies that specialize in
the representation of respondents at commitment hearings. 57 In addition,
many state facilities rely on a small number of clinicians who evaluate
all patients for whom commitment is proposed and offer testimony at the
commitment hearings.5
To complement this independent system, mediation would also be
available. 9 Clinicians or hearing officers could recommend mediation
to resolve difficult problems in a manner that is empowering to individuals in the mental health system. Any decision arrived at through mediation would seem more likely to be acceptable to the patient than one
imposed coercively by an administrative body. 0
Mediation is one of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
that has emerged in recent years in response to growing dissatisfaction
with traditional judicial models of resolving disputes. 61 A mediator
facilitates negotiation and sometimes permits the parties to reach a negotiated settlement to their dispute when the parties themselves are unable
to do so. Mediation has received extensive use in the resolution of fam53. Other systems with characteristics similar to those described herein include the Social
Security Administration in its evaluation and adjudication of disability claims, see, e.g., 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.915-.916 (1995); boards of registration which undertake professional discipline, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 458.307 (1995) (Board of Medicine); parole boards, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 947.002 (1995);
worker's compensation agencies, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (1995); and the Department of
Veterans' Affairs disability determination apparatus, see, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 1.770-.775 (1995).
54. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 30:4-27.2 to .5 (1995).
55. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1035 (1994).
56. E.g., California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.1 (Deering 1995); Pennsylvania, 50
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7303 (1995).
57. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:64 (West 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.60

(Anderson 1994).
58. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. R~v.
921, 930-32 (1985) (discussing differences between inpatient and outpatient evaluation
procedures for allegedly incompetent criminal defendants in state facilities).
59. See generally Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the
CurrentPracticeof Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 265, 27989 (1994) (discussing the use of mediation in civil commitment).
60. For example, one study determined that patients' perceptions of fair procedures seemed to
be an important determinant of perceived coercion. Jack Susman, Resolving Hospital Conflicts:
A Study on TherapeuticJurisprudence,22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107, 113-14 (1994); see also Dean
G. Pruitt et al., Long-term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 315 (1993).
61. See Pruitt et al., supra note 60, at 314.
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ily, matrimonial, labor and commercial disputes,62 and this technique
may hold much promise in the context of disputes arising within the
mental health system. Furthermore, participation in the mediation process may foster independence and increase self-esteem in ways that will
improve patient competency and community-living skills. 63
At present, the mental health system does not frequently use mediation to resolve disputes, perhaps because of the assumption that an individual diagnosed with a serious mental illness lacks the capacity to
engage in a mediation process.' 4 Empirical findings, however, do not
support this belief.65 For example, many persons diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder are in a psychotic condition only episodically.66
Moreover, former patients frequently assert that even when holding
psychotic beliefs, they can often discuss and negotiate about aspects of
their lives that are unrelated to such psychotic beliefs.67 If a substantial
percentage of mental health service recipients do have the capacity to
engage in a negotiated decisionmaking process, mediation might provide
a counterpart to the proposed independent system. In the alternative, it

could be a viable option to use within the current system.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

68

Even after legal confinement, an individual retains a constitutionally protected right to remain free from unwarranted government intru-

sions upon his or her person.69 Courts have cast this right in various
62. Id.; see also Janet B. Abisch, MedicationalLawyering in the Civil Commitment Context:
A TherapeuticJurisprudenceSolution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL. Pun. POL. & L.
120, 133-34 (1995).
63. Abisch, supra note 62, at 134; Haycock et al., supra note 59, at 282-83.
64. But see Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatricand Medical Treatments, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 149, 173 (1995) (finding most hospitalized mental patients perform within an
adequate range of treatment decisionmaking capacity).
65. Id.; Karen McKinnon et al., Rivers in Practice: Clinicians' Assessments of Patients'
Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & ComMuNrry PSYCHIATRY 1159, 1159-60 (1989).
66. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the
Implicationsfor Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 30-33 (1995).
67. See Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 64, at 168 (reporting that only 5% of respondents
were unable to express a choice among treatment options).
68. See generally WEINER & WErTSTEIN, supra note 3, at 121-24 (summarizing significant
right to refuse cases); Barbara A. Weiner, Treatment Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW, supra note 33, at 357-67 (providing table of states' restrictions on treatment).
69. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94
(1980). In the context of the right to remain free from the administration of psychotropic
medication, some courts have held that individuals have at least a qualified right to refuse
treatment. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1214 (1985); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984); State ex rel. Jones v.
Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 891-92 (Wis. 1987); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967-70
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terms, often depending on the type of proposed governmental action,
71
70
including a liberty interest in bodily integrity, freedom from restraint,
personal security,7 2 or as an aspect of the right to privacy. 73 The state,
however, may exercise its power to subject a patient to treatment without his or her consent. The state's interests are divided into two categories-its parenspatriaeauthority and its police power-which must be
balanced against the individual's liberty interest before the state may
forcibly administer medication.74
The state's authority to act as parenspatriae enables it to care for
those persons unable to care for themselves. 7 For example, the

Supreme Court employed the doctrine of parenspatriaein an attempt to
justify compulsory education in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder. 6
Courts historically have applied the doctrine to the involuntary commitment of those unable to survive in the community.7 7 Under the police

power, the state has authority to protect the community, 7 and to commit
dangerous, mentally ill people. 79 The distinction between the two interests is useful. The factors that are relevant to the assessment of state

activity to provide care for the helpless differ from those that compel the
state to protect the community from danger.80
The parenspatriae interest grew out of English common law pre(Colo. 1985); Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d
744, 748 (D.C. 1979).
70. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
71. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683 (1978).
73. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
74. Jessica Litman, Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the
InstitutionalizedMentally Ill, 82 COLtUM. L. Rev. 1720, 1738 (1982).
75. E.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-58 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986).
76. 406 U.S. 205, 229-31 (1972). In Yoder, the respondents were Amish parents who
objected to Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law because their children's attendance at
a private or public school would be contrary to the Amish way of life. The state's interest in
universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges upon other
fundamental rights such as the Free Exercise Clause and the parents' interest in the religious
upbringing of their children. The state's parens patriaepower could not be sustained. Id.
77. See Civil Commitment, supra note 8, at 1207-22; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
78. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, appellant was committed to
various institutions and later arrested on a misdemeanor charge of assault by threat. "[T]he state
...has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
of some who are mentally ill." Id. at 426; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 934-35
(N.D. Ohio 1980).
79. Litman, supra note 74, at 1738-39.
80. Id.; see, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (discussing the dichotomy of state interests).
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rogatives of the monarch who had the power to act as " 'the general
guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics.' "81 Although the basic function of the doctrine has been accepted in the United States, the Supreme
Court has enlarged its scope beyond the original common law purpose. 82
Society also has placed involuntary commitment of individuals under
the guise of the parenspatriae authority.83 Although limited to some
extent,8 4 the doctrine of parens patriae empowers a state to administer
treatment to a patient without obtaining consent,8 5 and thus conflicts
with the patient's liberty interest to refuse such treatment.
A state's police power to protect its citizens from harm also has
been used to justify forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to
mentally ill patients.8 6 The police power also extends to situations

within a mental institution to ensure the safety of staff and other
patients.87 For example, in Rogers v. Okin8 8 the district court held that a
hospital could forcibly medicate in an emergency situation "in which a
81. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *47).

82. The enlargement of the purpose of parens patriaemay have first begun in Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900). Louisiana, acting in its parenspatriae capacity, sought injunctive
relief against Texas officials who were prohibiting Louisiana merchants from distributing their
goods in Texas under the guise of a quarantine statute designed to combat yellow fever. Id. at 8.
83. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 581-83 (1975) (confinement of a nondangerous patient who is not receiving treatment is unconstitutional exercise of state's parens
patriaeauthority).
84. The government may legitimately invoke its parens patriae power only in the case of
individuals who, because of age or physical or mental disability, are incapable of determining
their own best interests. E.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-58 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 353 (I11.
1994); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986). Courts have recognized this limitation
on the parenspatriae power in the right to refuse treatment context, holding that assertions of this
governmental purpose as a justification for forced medication must be restricted to patients
determined to be incompetent to participate in treatment decisionmaking. E.g., Rennie v. Klein,
653 F.2d 836, 846 & n. 12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded,458 U.S. 1119 (1982);
Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657; In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d at 353; Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
85. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983); In re K.K.B., 609
P.2d, 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
86. See, e.g., Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 298 (8th Cir. 1987); Rennie,
653 F.2d at 838; Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343; Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 310.
87. E.g., State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 886, 894-95 (Wis. 1987)
(holding that involuntarily committed individuals who have not been adjudicated incompetent
have a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, unless such drugs are required to prevent serious
physical harm to the patient or others). Other courts have also recognized the state's police power
interest in protecting hospital staff and other patients from violence to be sufficiently compelling
to justify forced medication, at least in cases of emergency admission. E.g., Project Release v.
Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Rogers at
321-22; Rivers at 343.
88. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
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failure to do so would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm
to that patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution." 9
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the state's police
power in administering antipsychotic medication, holding that it outweighed the patient's liberty interest in refusing medication. 90
The First Circuit, however, criticized the lower court's opinion in
Rogers as a "simplistic unitary standard for police power emergency
drug administration." 9' The court favored, instead, a balancing
approach overseen by qualified state physicians who would use informal
procedures for making treatment decisions. 92 As a result, forcible medication would take place only when the need to prevent violence outweighed the possibility of harm to the medicated patient, and the
"reasonable alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics [are]
ruled out." 93
One of the first cases to address the issue of a patient's right to
refuse psychotropic medication in nonemergency situations was Rennie
v. Klein. 94 In Rennie, the court examined New Jersey's administrative
regulations governing medication refusals by hospitalized patients. Procedurally, the regulations provided for a three-step, in-house review of
treatment refusals. First, the attending physician must disclose treatment
information to the patient. If the patient then continues to refuse, the
treatment team meets (with the patient present if his or her condition
permits). If the treatment team does not resolve the issue, the facility's
medical director must personally examine the patient and review the
patient's records. The assistance of an independent psychiatrist is
optional. Finally, the medical director has the authority to authorize
forced medication. 95
Pointing to evidence that institutional pressures compromised the
in-house review process, the Rennie court stated that the procedures did
"not constitute the independent determination required by the due process clause."9 6 The court required the implementation of a number of
procedural safeguards, including an informal adversarial hearing before
89. Id. at 1365.
90. Rogers v. Okin,634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.

291 (1982).
91. Id. at 656.
92. Id. at 657.

93. Id. at 656.
94. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), stay denied in part,granted in part, 481 F. Supp. 552
(D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
95. Id. at 1303.
96. Id. at 1310.
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an independent psychiatrist. 97 On appeal, however, the Third Circuit
modified and remanded the district court's decision, finding that the
New Jersey administrative regulations satisfied both substantive and
procedural due process requirements. 98 The Third Circuit was satisfied
that the "state's procedures, if carefully followed, pose only a minor risk
of erroneous deprivation" and that "this risk will not be significantly
reduced by superimposing the district court's own requirements on those
already required by the state." 99 Central to the Third Circuit's reasoning
was its characterization of the decisions necessary in a forced medication determination as "medical" in nature. 10 Accordingly, the court
believed that the adversary hearing envisioned by the district court was
"ill-suited" to these types of decisions. 10 '
The Third Circuit supported its reasoning by quoting from the
Supreme Court's decision in Parham, stating that " 'due process is not
violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques' " when dealing with essentially medical determinations.10 2 The
court further relied on Parham in stating that adversary proceedings are
"more likely to be counterproductive, adding to the tensions that may
have contributed to the patient's initial commitment to the institution." 0 3 The court rejected the need for an independent review and
asserted that the district court's procedures would impose "substantial
additional financial burdens on 4the state and even greater expenditures
0
of staff time at the hospitals."'
Both the Rennie and Rogers decisions demonstrate judicial acceptance of flexible and informal administrative models for making treatment decisions. This acceptance continues under the influence of the
Supreme Court's mandate in Youngberg v. Romeo. 5 The Court empha97. Id. at 1312. The court also required the use of patient consent forms and the
establishment of a system of patient advocates. Id. at 1311.
98. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 458 U.S. 1119

(1982).
99. Id. at 850.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979)).

103. Id. at 851 (citing Parham,442 U.S. at 610).
104. Id.

105. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court held that patients committed to a state
mental institution possess a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in safe conditions
of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and minimally adequate training to insure these
protected rights. Id. at 324. The Court said that these liberty rights were not absolute, but were
subject to operational necessities of the institution. Id. at 319-20. In so holding, the Court
focused upon "the proper standard for determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily committed," concluding that courts are only required to make certain
that professional judgment was exercised. Id. at 321. The Youngberg Court, however, "did not
deal with decisions to administer or withhold medical treatment." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
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sized in Youngberg that "courts must show deference, to the judgment
exercised by a qualified professional .... Moreover, there certainly is
no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate
professionals in making [treatment] decisions." 106
The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harper'0 further
illustrates the influence of the Youngberg approach. In Harper, the
Court stated that a convicted prisoner's "interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"' 10 8 is "adequately protected, and
perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990). Thus, the question remains unresolved as to whether a
patient can refuse treatment prescribed under the professional judgment standard.
For a critique of the Youngberg decision and the professional judgment standard, especially
in treatment refusal cases where the individual asserts a negative right against invasive state
action, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication
Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard,'102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
106. 457 U.S. at 322-23. Shortly thereafter, the Court vacated and remanded Rennie for
deliberation in light of Youngberg. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), vacating and
remanding 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). On remand, the Third Circuit applied
Youngberg and affirmed its previous judgment, modifying its earlier reliance on a "least intrusive
means" analysis. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc). The court held
"that antipsychotic drugs may be constitutionally administered to an involuntarily committed
mentally ill patient whenever, in the exercise of professional judgment, such an action is deemed
necessary to prevent the patient from endangering himself or others." Id.at 269.
107. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
108. Id. at 221-22. Previously, the Court had held that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital for treatment in a mandatory behavior modification program implicated one of the
historic liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause: "[T]he 'right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.' " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 492 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)); see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 600 (1979); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 131 (1990) (noting that an individual has a "substantial liberty interest in avoiding
confinement in a mental hospital").
Numerous federal and state courts had also applied this liberty interest in freedom from
unjustified governmental intrusions to involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs. See, e.g.,
United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 979 (8th Cir.), reh 'ggranted in part, vacated in part sub
nom. United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Watson v. United
States, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990) (intrusion on personal security represented by the "potential of
psychotropic drugs for altering a patient's mental processes and the risk of severe side effects"
gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest); accord Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823,
825 (4th Cir. 1984); Rogers v. Okin,634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Some courts have found a constitutional liberty interest implicated
by compulsory treatment with antipsychotic drugs because such treatment invades bodily integrity
and personal dignity. United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal
dismissed, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-31 (1980);
Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 206-08 (Ct. App. 1987); Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983). Other courts have
found forced drugging is analogous to the intrusion presented by physical restraints and therefore
it gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d
302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987);
R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Project Release v Prevost, 551 F.
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by medical professionals rather than a judge."' 10 9 The Court maintained
that " 'the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis [cannot]
always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist...
to an untrained judge ...after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a
hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric decision.' "110 The Court also voiced a concern that "requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce prison resources, both money and the
staff's time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill inmates.""'
Finding "no indication that any institutional biases affected or
altered the decision to medicate respondent against his will," the majority was satisfied that existing procedures assured the "independence of
the decisionmaker. ' "I2 Further, the Court endorsed an internal review
system, justifying its approval by citing studies which indicated that
even outside decisionmakers most often concur with the treating physician's recommendation to medicate involuntarily. 13 Finally, the Court
reasoned that because medical personnel are conducting the review, the
rules of evidence and a standard of proof are neither helpful nor
required."I4
Two years later, in Riggins v. Nevada, 115 the Court again addressed
the rights of prisoners, this time in the context of the forced medication
with antipsychotic drugs of a criminal defendant during his trial. Riggins held that the state violated the defendant's due process rights when
it forced him to stand trial while on a heavy dose of Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug that had negatively affected his demeanor and probably
also his ability to participate in the proceedings." 16 The Court's holding
was narrow, turning on the absence of sufficient findings by the trial
court to justify continuing medication over the defendant's objection." 7
The Court's opinion contained important dicta, however, suggesting the
Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Large v. Superior Court,
714 P.2d 399, 406 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
109. Harper,494 U.S. at 231.
110. Id. at 232 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 609 (citation omitted)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 233. Prior to administering drugs involuntarily to any inmate, prison procedures
required that the inmate receive notice and a hearing before a tribunal of medical professionals
and prison authorities, at which time the inmate could challenge the decision to give him the drug
treatment. Id. at 215-16. The Court found that this informal hearing procedure complied with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 225; see also Walton v. Norris, 59 F.3d 67, 68-69
(8th Cir. 1995) (upholding procedures similar to those discussed in Harper). The Supreme Court
has not clarified whether such procedures would be sufficient outside the prison context.
113. 494 U.S. at 234 n.13.
114. Id. at 235.
115. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
116. Id. at 137-38.
117. Id. at 138.
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standards to be applied in future cases raising the right to refuse treatment issue in the criminal trial context.
Reiterating that antipsychotic medication intrudes on a significant
liberty interest,' 1 8 the Court in Riggins restated the Harper standard as
requiring that the state show both an "overriding justification" for such
treatment and "a determination of medical appropriatenesss" for the
individual.1 19 The Court identified two potential justifications for forced
administration of antipsychotic medication in the criminal trial or pretrial context, but found that the record in the case failed to support the
presence of either. First, the Court noted that the state "certainly" would
have satisfied due process "if the prosecution had demonstrated and the
District Court had found" that involuntary medication was "medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the
sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others."' 120 Second, the
Court noted that the state "might" have been able to justify "medically
appropriate" involuntary medication "by establishing that it could not
obtain an adjudication of [his criminal charges] by using less intrusive
means."

12 1

Both the Harper and Riggins opinions are noteworthy. Specifically, the Harper Court expressly recognized that the right to refuse

medical treatment is a constitutionally protected interest.' 22 However, in
118. Id. at 133-34.
119. Id. at 135.
120. Id.
121. Id. Recently, in State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 962 (Conn. 1995), the Supreme Court of
Connecticut pondered the meaning of the United States Supreme Court's use of the word "might"
in Riggins. In particular, the court was unclear as to whether "the state can justify involuntary
treatment to restore a defendant to competency for the sole purpose of bringing him to trial, or
whether. . . such treatment is justified . . . only if certain conditions are met." Id. The court
concluded that "the state's interest in bringing the defendant to trial can constitute an overriding
justification for the involuntary medication of the defendant under certain circumstances." Id.
The decision also specified standards for a court to consider before a judge can order medication
over a defendant's objection. Id. at 966. Connecticut thus joins approximately six other states
that have developed criteria for involuntary medication of criminal defendants. See Slants &
Trends, 13 MENTAL HEALTH L. REP. 41, 41 (1995).

122. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("a competent person has a constitutionally protected
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"); In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 351 (11. 1994).
In a 1982 case involving the right of hospital patients to refuse psychotropic drugs, the Court
avoided the opportunity to address the constitutional issues. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, which had recognized a federal
constitutional right to refuse medication. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980). The
Court remanded the case to the lower court to consider whether an intervening decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass.
1981), which had recognized a right to refuse grounded in state law, rendered unnecessary the
resolution of the federal constitutional question. Mills, 457 U.S. at 306. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts subsequently reiterated a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Mass. 1983). The court of
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Harper and later in Riggins, the Court only addressed the rights of convicted prisoners, failing to indicate whether those rights apply to involuntarily confined civil patients. 123 Moreover, the Court's decisions
failed to discuss adequately the nature of the liberty interest it found to
be invaded by involuntary antipsychotic medication. Most significantly,
although recognizing that involuntary antipsychotic medication invades
a "substantial liberty interest," the Riggins Court failed to clarify
whether that interest will be deemed "fundamental," and therefore
deserving of traditional strict judicial scrutiny, rather than the more deferential standard applied in Harper. The Court's decisions thus leave
the constitutional issues raised by involuntary mental health treatment
substantially unresolved and provide little guidance concerning how the
asserted right to refuse treatment would be dealt with outside the prison.
On the other hand, in a line of cases dating back to the mid-1960's,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished between the substantive
and procedural rights of individuals imprisoned through the criminal justice system and those involuntarily hospitalized through the civil system. 124 This criminal-civil distinction suggests that the restrictions on a
convicted prisoner's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs are not automatically applicable to civil patients. As the Court emphasized, "[t]here are
few cases in which the State's interest in combating the danger posed by
a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment, which, 'by definition,' is made up of persons with 'a demonstrated
appeals thereafter approved the state procedures adopted in that case, finding them to "equal or
exceed the rights provided in the federal Constitution." Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1984).
123. Harper, for instance, applied the deferential approach for scrutinizing constitutional
claims that the Court customarily uses in the prison context. Harper,494 U.S. at 224 (applying a
standard of "reasonableness"). Harper seems to reflect the approach of an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court, disinclined to intrude into state processes and especially deferential
to institutional administrators. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prisons);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prisons); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214 (1985) (state medical school's academic decisions); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982) (mental retardation facilities); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (mental hospitals);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (schools). Whether recent appointments to the Court
will have an impact on these trends remains to be seen.
124. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366-68 (1983) (insanity defense acquittee may be
committed to a psychiatric facility, even though the defense was established by a "preponderance
of the evidence," rather than by "clear and convincing" evidence); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
487-88 (1980) (prisoner subjected to transfer to mental hospital entitled to same procedural
safeguards as in civil commitment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) ("reasonabledoubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings"); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107, 111-12 (1966) ("no conceivable basis for distinguishing the comnmitment of a person [in jail)
from all other civil commitments"). See generally John Parry, The Supreme CourtFashionsNew
Boundariesfor Involuntary Care and Treatment, 14 MENTAL & Pw'sIcAL DISALim'T L. REP. 198
(1990).
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proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.' "125 The
Court, in Harper,suggested that "under other circumstances [the state]
would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of
review.

' ' l z6

Contrary to the Court's decisions in Harperand Riggins, the interest of the mentally ill civil patient is at least as great, if not greater, than
a convicted prisoner's interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized
that "[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to
more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
27
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.'"1
As one federal circuit court of appeals also noted, in rejecting the state's
contention that involuntary commitment takes away all aspects of a
patient's constitutional liberty, "the patient's liberty is diminished [by
commitment] only to the extent necessary to allow for confinement by
the state so as to prevent him from being a danger to himself or to
others."

128

More important, the determination made at an involuntary treatment hearing may put the civil patient's life or liberty at serious risk.
This is analogous to the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Ake v.
Oklahoma.'2 9 In Ake, the Court reasoned that a mentally ill criminal
defendant's interest in having "a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of the defense"1 30 was uniquely compelling because the
outcome of the judicial proceeding may put the defendant's life or liberty at risk. 131 Furthermore, the Court found that the state's financial
125. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
126. Id. at 223. But see Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the Criminal Trial
Process: The Constitutionaland Therapeutic Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. HUM. RTS. 637, 702 (1993) (arguing that, based on Riggins, the Court will construe the right to
refuse treatment outside the prison context more broadly than Harper).
127. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); see also Clark v. Donahue, 885 F.
Supp. 1164, 1166 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (entitling involuntarily committed patients to more protected
conditions of confinement than convicted criminals).
128. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 838, 843 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
129. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Court considered "whether, and under what conditions,
the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a defense to require the
State to provide an indigent [criminal] defendant with access to competent psychiatric assistance
in preparing a defense." Id. at 77. It expressed a particular concern with "the accuracy of a
criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk." Id. at 78. This concern, the
Court explained, weighed heavily in the analysis. Id. The Court recognized the significant role
that a psychiatrist plays in creating and presenting a defense, as well as the many ways a
psychiatrist can assist the defendant and his attorney. Id. at 79-82. Moreover, the Court
trivialized the state's fiscal concern in requiring this procedural safeguard. Id. at 78.
130. Id. at 83.
131. Id. at 78.
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burden in providing a psychiatrist was minimal, as compared to the significant personal interest at stake in a criminal proceeding. 32 This reasoning is equally compelling with regard to the personal interest at stake
in an involuntary treatment proceeding.
The due process protection extended to a criminal defendant or a
convicted prisoner whose mental capacity is in issue should be extended
to a civilly committed mental patient in danger of being medicated forcibly because the patient's mental capacity is also in issue. The judicial
proceedings afforded to both the criminal and the civil patient are quite
similar and, therefore, a hearing to determine mental capacity or treatment decisions should be labeled quasi-criminal in nature.' 3 3 Due process concerns in both proceedings are virtually the same, and in some
ways, much more troublesome for the involuntary mental patient. Similarly, both the patient and the criminal defendant are in danger of losing
liberties.

34

Beyond this loss of physical liberty, however, the civil

patient who is medicated forcibly is in danger of suffering irreversible
135
harm caused by the side effects of the unwanted treatment.
A state could argue, however, under the professional judgment

standard, displayed in Youngberg, Parham, and Harper,that by holding
medical decisions "presumptively valid"' 3 6 the institutions will be
spared the long, arduous, and costly process of judicial hearings. However, speedy adjudication should not be the only goal when making
132. Id. at 78-79.
133. For example, the Supreme Court has held a probable cause hearing to be required in the
criminal context. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975). Such a right should also apply
in the civil commitment system.
134. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty").
135. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) that certain
drugs are" 'mind altering.' Their effectiveness resides in their capacity to achieve such effects."
Id. at 293 n.l. Accord Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 483 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987); In re
C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Il1.1994). See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (Weis, J.,
concurring) ("Unlike the temporary and predictable effects of bodily restraints,
the permanent side effects of antipsychotic drugs induce conditions that cannot be corrected
simply be cessation of the regimen. The permanency of these effects is analogous to that resulting
from such radical surgical procedures as a pre-frontal lobotomy."); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 1981) ("Because of both the profound effect that these drugs have on the
thought processes of an individual and the well-established likelihood of severe and irreversible
adverse side effcts ... we treat these drugs in the same manner we would treat psychosurgery or
electroconvulsive therapy."); see also Thomas G.Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control,"
"Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects
ofAntipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFsTRA L. REv. 77, 107-09 (1983); Elyn R. Saks, Competency
to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternative to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U.
MIAmI L. Rav. 689, 730 (1993).
136. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
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treatment decisions.137 Rather, adequate protection of the valid liberty

interest in being free from unnecessary antipsychotic medication should
be given equal consideration. Forcibly medicating a patient, absent
review of that decision, violates the patient's procedural due process
rights.' 38 Consequently, a counseled judicial hearing should be held to
consider the questions of dangerousness and competence to make medication decisions.1 39 In all cases, the law would follow its long-standing
tradition of the presumption of competence to make medical decisions 40
and the more recent approach of not equating civil commitment with
incompetency.'
Indeed, an individual may be mentally ill, even
psychotic, and yet be capable of decisionmaking in a variety of areas,
including evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of particular
treatments.142 To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof would rest
137. Furthermore, in United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), the court notes
that despite those who would argue that "judicial approval of forcible medication imposes a
needless and unwieldy obstacle to proper and prompt treatment," id. at 498-99, such approval will
not "slow the decisional process" since "the court can approve a reasonable treatment plan
effective over a period of time and periodically review[ ]"it. Id. at 499 n.28. In short, judicial
scrutiny of the right to refuse treatment "does not place a significant burden on institutional
resources." Id.
138. Moreover, no evidence exists to establish that coerced medication of a patient is effective.
Durham & La Fond, supra note 31, at 351-56, 367-68.
139. The Supreme Court has said indigent criminal defendants, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972), and juveniles alleged to be delinquent, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), have a
right to appointed counsel. Since civil commitment can also lead to a deprivation of liberty,
civilly committed patients should have a similar right to counsel.
140. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 129 (N.Y. 1914) (According to
Judge Cardozo, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine
what shall be done with his own body."); see also Lotman v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d
868, 873 (3d. Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,404 U.S.
985 (1971); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361, 1363-64 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part,
vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982); Child v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 1963); Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d
812, 814 (Wash. 1967); see also Morris, supra note 9, at 347; Barry D. Rosenfeld & Eric N.
Turkheimer, Modeling Psychiatric Patients' Treatment Decision Making, 19 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 389, 402 (1995). Even if such patients do not possess sufficient competence, allowing

them as great a degree of choice as circumstances permit may be therapeutically beneficial.
Morris, supra note 9, at 434.
141. E.g., Winters, 446 F.2d at 68 (finding a patient mentally ill does not create a presumption
that he is incompetent to make decisions); Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1361 ("[A]lthough committed,
a mental patient is nonetheless presumed competent to manage his affairs, dispose of property,
carry on a licensed profession, and even to vote."). Virtually all states now provide by statute that
civil commitment alone does not justify the conclusion that a patient may be deprived of civil
rights or is incompetent to exercise them. See Blackburn, supra note 9, at 471-72 nn.87-88
(listing statutes).
142. See, e.g., Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 64, at 173 (finding most patients in an
empirical study who were hospitalized for schizophrenia and major depression able to engage in
treatment decisionmaking within an acceptable range of competence); McKinnon et al., supra
note 65, at 1159 ("Clinical evidence suggests that despite alterations in thinking and mood,
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with those seeking to medicate forcibly. 143
Since antipsychotic drugs carry potentially dangerous side effects,
every decision to administer these drugs also needs review by a physician outside the mental health facility. This should be the case despite
the argument that even an independent psychiatrist is likely to share the
approach, perspective, and biases of the treating doctor. 1" Anything
less than a review of this nature compromises the incompetent patient's
due process interests by presuming that antipsychotic drugs best treat the
illness.
Equally important, Rivers v. Katz1 45 distinctly established that a
patient has a liberty interest in deciding whether to be medicated.146 In
Rivers, the New York Court of Appeals relied on state constitutional and
common law in holding that the administrative review procedures previously affirmed by the Second Circuit in ProjectRelease v. Prevost147 did
not adequately protect the privacy interests of committed mental
patients. 4 " The court mandated a finding of incompetency before medicating a patient for treatment purposes against his or her will. " 'Otherwise, the very justification for the state's purported exercise of its parens
patriae power-its citizen's inability to care for himself ... would be
missing.' "149
Granted, even when the constitution is relied on to support a
patient's refusal of antipsychotic drugs, there is no guarantee that the
refusal will be upheld. Constitutional rights are not absolute; they must
be balanced against the government's legitimate reasons for infringement. 50 Generally, the more important the constitutionally protected
interest, the stronger the government's justification must be to override
the interest.' 5' At a minimum, a governmental infringement of a propsychiatric patients are not automatically less capable than others of making health care
decisions.").
143. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15

(Mass. 1983).
144. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 234 n.13 (1990); Alexander D. Brooks, The
ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. AcAn. PSYCHIATRY & L.

179, 199 (1980); Morris, supra note 9, at 431-32.
145. 494 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).

146. Id. at 341-42. The Supreme Court also has held that an individual has a constitutionally
protected interest in refusing treatment. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
147. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
148. 494 N.E.2d at 341-44.
149. Id. at 343 (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980)).
150. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299
(1982).
151. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1976). In addition, the Supreme Court
has found the right to freedom of choice in certain matters affecting a person's life to be of
"fundamental" value. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). The freedom to make
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tected liberty interest must be "reasonably related to legitimate government objectives.""2' ' However, as the intrusiveness of the government's
action rises, the sufficiency of its justification must also increase.153 A
compelling governmental interest and a showing that no less intrusive
means are available to achieve the objective must support highly intrusive conduct. 154 Thus, even when the government's interest in restricting a constitutionally protected right is sufficiently important, the least
restrictive alternative doctrine imposes an additional burden.
The essence of this doctrine is that the government may not pursue
its ends, however compelling, by means which unnecessarily encroach
upon fundamental rights. The classic exposition of the doctrine came in
Shelton v. Tucker,'5 5 in which the United States Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light 6of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
5
purpose.'

The least restrictive alternative principle is an analytical guideline
for determining whether the government has exercised prudence in
selecting the means to accomplish an otherwise legitimate end. The first
case in the mental health area to apply the least restrictive alternative
doctrine was Lake v. Cameron.157 In that case, Chief Judge Bazelon
questioned the necessity of the "complete deprivation of liberty" attendant to the continued institutionalization of a non-dangerous elderly
woman.1 58 Based on a District of Columbia commitment statute, the
court held that the government has an affirmative duty to explore all
treatment alternatives so that "deprivations of liberty . . . [do] not go
beyond what is necessary for [the patient's] protection."' 59 Thereafter,
fundamental decisions has been characterized as " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' "or
"'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' " Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19192 (1986) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the positive benefits of freedom of choice are well
documented. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37
VILL. L. REv. 1705, 1755-68 (1992) (summarizing psychology of choice literature).
152. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
153. See Winick, supra note 19, at 400.
154. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
768-70 (1966).
155. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, the Court addressed a challenge to a state statute that
required school teachers to reveal all their organizational associations for the past five years.
156. Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
157. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (5-4 decision).
158. Id. at 660-61.
159. Id. at 659-60.
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courts began applying the doctrine to commitment decisions, 60 condi62
tions of confinement, 161 and treatment decisions within institutions.
In sum, only sufficiently important governmental objectives may
outweigh a patient's protected interests in refusing antipsychotic medication. However, the patient's rights are meaningless without accompanying procedural mechanisms to establish the validity of an asserted
governmental objective. The Due Process Clause requires that procedural safeguards be employed when balancing a constitutionally protected right against a competing governmental interest. Even if not
expressly protected by the Constitution, state law can also create liberty
interests which are entitled to the minimum procedural protections mandated by the Due Process Clause. 63 Therefore, when state constitutional, statutory, or common law confers a right to refuse treatment,
Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections must be observed. 16
V.

ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURES TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
TREATMENT

Despite Parham's suggestion that the "supposed protections of an
adversary proceeding ...

may well be more illusory than real,"' 65 the

courts should be the final decisionmaker when an involuntarily hospitalized patient refuses medication.1 66 Although the Supreme Court has
endorsed expert decisionmakers and minimal, informal procedures,
160. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
161. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 113 (3d Cir. 1979), stay
granted in part, 448 U.S. 905 (1980), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F.
Supp. 974, 979 (D.D.C. 1975).
162. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20, 1228-31 (E.D. La. 1976); Davis v.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
163. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).
164. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir. 1983). Under certain
circumstances, the state may also confer procedural protections of liberty interests that extend
beyond those minimally required by the Federal Constitution. Mills, 457 U.S. at 300; see, e.g.,
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-50 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the state constitution
guarantees a right to privacy even during civil commitment and requires judicial review before a
patient may be medicated involuntarily); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986)
(finding that neither mental disability nor hospitalization will justify overriding an individual's
fundamental right to refuse treatment under the due process clause of the state constitution).
165. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
166. Through the years commentators have questioned the court's role in making treatment
decisions. See David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742,

742-43 (1969); Brooks, supra note 144, at 201-13; Plotkin, supra note 41, at 462-63; Civil
Commitment, supranote 8, at 1333-36. Judge David Bazelon seems to have responded best to this
criticism:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists,
aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason,
however, many people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a
proposed dam on fish life, while they reject similar scrutiny of the effect of
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judges should remain in a role that assures that "there has been a full
exploration of all relevant facts, opposing views and possible alternatives, [and] whether the results of the exploration relate rationally to the
ultimate decision. "167 Through the adversary process, courts are assisted
by attorneys representing each side in sorting motivational nuances, and
operating within the context
of conflicting facts, opinions, interests, and
16
professional principles.

1

Merely because a medical expert may decide some issues in a case
"does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that justify
the requirement of adversary hearings.' 69 Courts should determine
whether the given level of medical certainty-whatever that level may
be-warrants infringement of a patient's constitutional rights. That
determination should no more be left to medical discretion than the
determination of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment is left to
police discretion.
Furthermore, if a court is unable to make an informed decision on
conflicting medical evidence after thorough evaluation, the Supreme
Court has suggested that such uncertainty dictates against allowing the
medical intervention. For example, in Winston v. Lee, 170 the Court
denied the government's request to perform minor surgery on a suspect
to recover a bullet for evidentiary purposes. After addressing the fundamental interests involved, the Court pointed to the dispute between medical experts on the degree of risk presented by the surgery and held that
this "very uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be
'reasonable.' "171
Indeed, the reliance by the Supreme Court on expert decisionmakers using informal procedural mechanisms does not comport
with its long-standing disparagement of the judgment of psychiatrists
psychiatric treatment on human lives. . . . [I]t can hardly be that we are more
concerned for the salmon than the schizophrenic.
Bazelon, supra, at 743. Despite the controversy, courts providing only limited due process protec-

tion for the right to refuse treatment represent the minority view, at least among state courts. See
generally Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993) (reviewing the trend toward a liberal interpretation of procedural due process

protections on behalf of patients in state court proceedings).
167. David L. Bazelon, Institutional, Deinstitutionalizationand the Adversary Process, 75
COLuM. L. REv. 897, 910 (1975).

168. See Winsor C. Schmidt & Randy Otto, A Legal and Behavioral Science Analysis of
Statutory Guidelines for Children's Mental Health and Substance Abuse Service: The Florida
Case, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 49-50 (1988).
169. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430
(1979)).
170. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

171. Id. at 766.
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and psychologists and its concern about their ability to make reliable and
valid decisions. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring opinion
in O'Connor v. Donaldson,172 "[tihere can be little responsible debate
regarding the 'uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness
of professional judgment.' "173 The majority, as well, acknowledged the
"uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy, and [that] the
reported cases are replete with evidence of the divergence of medical
opinion in this vexing area."174 The Court in Parham similarly
described medical and psychiatric diagnosis as fallible 175 and based on
impressions drawn from subjective analysis.1 76 This criticism continues
unabated into the present decade.177 In addition, studies have documented a high degree7 of inaccuracy in the clinical judgments of mental
health professionals. 1
The Supreme Court's developing preference for informal administrative determinations and the very truncated scope of judicial review in
this area also conflicts with the burgeoning research on procedural justice. 179 The consequences in the face of this research are that erroneous
172. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
173. Id. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 360,
375 (1956)).

174. Id. at 579.
175. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). "Even under the best of circumstances

psychiatric diagnosis and therapy decisions are fraught with uncertainties." Id. at 628 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).
177. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 n.3 (1992) (acknowledging probable
validity to view that "psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists widely disagree on what
constitutes a mental illness"); id. at 109 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("it is unwise... to suggest that a
determination that a person has 'regained sanity' is precise. 'Psychiatry is not ...an exact
science ......."(quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985))); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 141 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (doubtful that experts can establish "baseline of
normality" for any particular defendant); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990) (noting
the difficulty in assessing mental patients' intentions); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 293-94
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (evidence "overwhelming" in support of conclusion that available
diagnostic tools cannot reliably predict whether minors will act violently); Edmund V. Ludwig,
The Mentally Ill Homeless: Evolving Involuntary Commitment Issues, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1085,
1100 (1991) ("A number of Supreme Court Justices ...have written on the incertitude of mental
health clinician testimony.").
178. Hal R. Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to Legal
Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429 (1989); Steve Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck:
Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549 (1988); see
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
professional predictions of violence are more likely to be wrong than correct); see also Joseph J.
Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failureof PsychiatricPredictionsof Dangerousness: Clear
and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); John Monahan & David
B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37, 40-41 (1978).
179. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS
(1990); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
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decisions will go largely unchecked. Mentally disabled persons, left
more resistant to the treatwith perceptions of unfairness, will become
180
ment they are compelled to endure.
Procedural justice investigates various methods of dispute resolution, focusing primarily on the fairness of the decisionmaking process as
perceived by the participants.18 ' The results of research on the perceived fairness between adversarial and inquisitorial procedures have
been remarkably consistent.18 2 First, subjects express a clear preference
for adversarial procedures over inquisitorial ones.1 83 Second, subjective
judgments of fairness strongly influence this preference; the adversarial
process is perceived as more fair than the inquisitorial process.'8 4 Perceptions of fairness are related to the degree of control that disputants
m
85
have over the dispute resolution process.

One of the consistent findings in the procedural justice literature is
that the sense of fairness that arises out of genuinely adversarial pro-

ceedings evokes greater satisfaction with the outcome and more acceptance of the verdict, even by the losing party.'8

6

The failure to provide

an adversarial forum, then, is likely to reduce compliance with the decision, thereby producing increased temporal, financial, and administrative
burdens on the institutions and professionals who participate in proceedings perceived as unfair, biased, and unjust. Thus, a mental health system that prefers informal procedures and nonlegal decisionmakers to
and detrigovern the right to refuse treatment may be antitherapeutic
87
mental to the population of mentally disabled persons.1
(1988); Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participantand Observer Satisfaction with Adversary
and InquisitorialModes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531 (1978); E.
Allan Lind et al., Voice. Control, and ProceduralJustice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental
Concerns in FairnessJudgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); Norman G.
Poythress, ProceduralPreferences, Perceptionsof Fairness,and Compliance with Outcomes, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361 (1994); John Thibaut et al., ProceduralJustice as Fairness,26 STAN.
L. REV. 1271 (1974).
180. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric
Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 341 (1980); Winick, supra note 20, at 192-99; Bruce J.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The DistinctionBetween Assent and Objection, 28
Hous. L. REv. 15, 46-53 (1991).
181. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 179, at 26-30 (discussing studies that show connections
between perceived fairness and procedural rules).
182. Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Casefor Elaborating Our Model of
ProceduralFairness,49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 953, 956 (1985).
183. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 179, at 32-33; LaTour, supra note 179, at 1531-33.
184. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 179, at 28-29.
185. Id. at 34-35; Poythress, supra note 179, at 361-62.
186. LIND & TYLER, supra note 179, at 11; Susman, supra note 60, at 121.
187. The Supreme Court has impliedly acknowledged the therapeutic value of fair procedures
in holding that parolees have a right to a probable cause hearing before their paroles may be
revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 264-65 (1970) (recognizing that a hearing furthered the government interest in reinforcing
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Conversely, one study found that formal hearings permitted
patients to better understand both their doctor's professional opinions,

and reasons for requiring medication. 188 This shows hearings may have
substantial therapeutic benefit to the patient; the ability to present an
opinion to a physician on a relatively equal basis could help to improve
self-esteem. If viewed as a forum for arbitrating a dispute in good faith,
hearings also could strengthen the doctor and patient therapeutic alliance, which is crucial for proper treatment.' 89 In this fashion, we might
view judicial hearings as the only way to allow open exchanges between
doctors and patients in settings that are inherently coercive.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is likely that few mental patients have read the Bill of Rights.
The immediate problems they are unable to bear may seem remote from
the Due Process Clause. Yet, the whole problem of admission of the
mentally ill to hospitals is tied to the question of depriving citizens of
their personal liberty.
At first glance, it may seem that a proposal for an independent
commitment system that relies on non-adversarial procedures cannot be
reconciled with an adversarial system necessary to protect the right of
patients to refuse treatment. Perhaps it could also be argued that a dis-

junction between procedures for commitment and procedures for treatment may leave a group of committed patients who cannot be treated

and for whom the psychiatric hospital becomes literally a place of detention. On the other hand, the present system is already a thinly disguised
form of preventive detention that fails to enhance therapeutic values.
"the Nation's basic commitment.., to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders"). Developing legal and psychological literature further examines how the legal system
may act more therapeutically. See, e.g., Wexler & Winick, supra note 49, at 985 ("Although
Chief Justice Warren Burger [in Parham] defended his judgment based on concerns that a hearing
would burden the family relationship and be detrimental to the therapeutic goals of
hospitalization, others have questioned these assumptions and suggested that there is a therapeutic
value in holding formal commitment hearings."); see also WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 48, at
75-79. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990).

188. Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of Clinicaland JudicialProceduresfor Reviewing
Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 851, 855

(1988).
189. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Stephen K. Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What
the Research Reveals, 4 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 279, 291 (1986); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse
Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
99, 112 (1994). Even outside the context of a hearing, the American Psychiatric Association has
acknowledged that psychiatrists should "maximize the patient's participation in the treatment
decisionmaking process; and, if the patient registers objections, to try to understand the basis for
these objections ... ." Morris, supra note 9, at 434 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N,
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION RESOURCE DOCUMENT 3 (1989)).
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The primary purpose of civil commitment is not to punish for past
acts, but to control future ones. The impetus for a civil commitment
system does not stem from retributive or deterrence concerns, but rather
is based on a perceived need for incapacitation or treatment, or both.
When individuals must be sent to mental hospitals against their will,
they should not have to undergo an adversarial procedure where they are
likely to be treated like criminals and be tried and convicted of being
sick. Moreover, procedures in the admissions process are only steppingstones to treatment. These procedures do not need to be under judicial
control. An independent system, with both psychiatrists and hearing
officers specially trained in civil commitment, would refine due process
and enhance therapeutic values. As a result, treatment would be more
effective, which would reduce the chances for involuntary intervention
and lead to earlier release.
At the same time, all individuals hospitalized involuntarily are entitled to watchful protection of their rights, protection that arguably only
the courts can provide. 90 Indeed, involuntarily hospitalized individuals
are citizens first and mental patients second. For all its faults, the courtroom is still the most objective and fair forum for resolving disputes.
The courts represent one branch of government whose mission is not to
follow the whims of the majority. By design, men and women who
remain relatively insulated from minor fluctuations in public opinion
steer the courts. Therefore, the courts are uniquely capable and thus
responsible for the protection of those whom the larger society may
choose to ignore. Those concerned with civil commitment and involuntarily confined patients' legal rights will demand procedures that minimize the possibility of infringement of those rights, since it is the
business of law to protect patients' constitutional rights.
DOUGLAS S. STRANSKY

190. Contra Samuel J. Brakel & John M. Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental
Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REv. 429, 433-34 & n.14 (1991) (noting
that medical professionals rather than judges should make treatment refusal decisions). However,
even Brakel and Davis concede that constitutional grounds may rebut this contention. Id. at 434.

